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WILHELM: I’m afraid ...
GRACE: There’s nothing to be afraid of! We’ve taken all the family’s weapons!
WILHELM: No, I am afraid of what will happen now. I fear we ain’t ready for
a completely new way of life. At Manderlay we slaves took supper at 7 ... when do
people take supper when they are free? We don’t know these things ...
(From Manderlay, Lars von Trier (2005))
1 Introduction
During the last two decades a growing number of works have tried to for-
malize the idea of preference for freedom of choice (see, among many others,
Jones and Sugden (1982), Pattanaik and Xu (1990, 1998, 2000), Sen (1991,
1993), Bossert et al. (1994), Puppe (1995, 1996), Bossert (1997, 2000), or
Sugden (1998)). In most cases, the central object of analysis is that of an
opportunity set, which is defined as the set of mutually exclusive options
available to the decision maker, from which he (and not nature or chance)
chooses one. Opportunity sets are then taken as a reference to evaluate the
degree of freedom of choice enjoyed by an individual. A common and very
natural characteristic of this approach is a monotonicity feature, according
to which any enlargement of an agent’s opportunity set leads to either a strict
or weak improvement in terms of freedom of choice.
The main motivation of our work stems from the experience of many
situations where, together with a preference for freedom of choice, individu-
als at some point display an aversion to excessive complexity in the choice
problem, and therefore a preference for simpler problems with fewer options.
Everyday examples include situations such as ordering a meal from a menu
in a restaurant, picking a particular brand of tooth paste from the shelf in
a supermarket, deciding which model of car to buy, or employers that hire
human resource companies to pre-select job candidates, thus revealing their
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willingness to pay to have their opportunity sets reduced.
In this paper, we propose an axiomatic model that aims to be consistent
with two conflicting assumptions - on the one hand, the preference for free-
dom of choice, which drives a preference for larger sets, and on the other
hand, the preference for ease of choice, which implies fewer options.
The possible motivations for a preference for freedom of choice have been
firmly rooted in the spheres of economics and philosophy since Mill (1956) or
Nozick (1974), and also in the psychology literature, especially since Lewin
(1952). Both fields provide motivation to consider individual freedom of
choice as something with a value that transcends the quality of the possible
alternatives, having more to do with their actual availability. This is a point
of view that we will maintain throughout the paper.1
Concerning the roots of the preference for ease of choice, we explain this
phenomenon as an aversion to the menu including alternatives that exceed a
certain degree of ambiguity. The literature provides at least four explanations
that support this hypothesis. The first views ambiguous options as those that
raise the computational costs involved in the choice problem. According to
the second explanation, the presence of ambiguous options makes it more
difficult for the agent to justify his choice to others. The third perceives
ambiguous options as tempting alternatives that involve self-control costs for
the decision maker. Finally, the availability of ambiguous options may also
increase the likelihood of regret.
With respect to the first explanation, authors such as Simon (1955, 1956),
or Krulee (1955) had already introduced in the economic literature the idea
1 For a survey on the economic roots for the intrinsic value of freedom of choice, see
Barbera` et al. (2004). For different theories about the psychological benefits of freedom
of choice, see, for example, Langer and Rodin (1976), Deci (1985), or Taylor (1989).
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that decision processes involve computational costs, and that human beings
display a preference for coherence in their decisions (see also Shafir et al.
(1993), Montgomery (1983) or Tversky and Kahneman (1986)). This, as
Simon (1955) suggests, might motivate individuals to self-restrict the set of
available alternatives as a way to simplify the choice problem. Very plausi-
bly, ambiguous options are those that most increase the computational costs
that decision procedures need in order to reach minimal standards of internal
coherence. This, using Payne’s (1982) words, could be interpreted as if am-
biguous options would increase the “task complexity” of the choice problem.
Therefore, the decision maker, at some point, might prefer to face a choice
with fewer, but unambiguous and sufficiently well-known options.
Sometimes the desire for coherence of choice stems from the need to justify
choices to others (the spouse, a superior, or a social group to which the agent
belongs) (see, for example, Blau (1964), Tetlock (1985), Curley et al. (1986),
or Simonson (1989)). In such a situation, the presence of ambiguous options
might make it more difficult to provide others with convincing reasons to
support a choice that has already been made.
A third possible explanation is associated with the psychological cost of
disappointment experienced by individuals who have chosen an alternative
that turns out to be less satisfactory than expected (see Bell (1985), Loomes
and Sugden (1986) or Gul (1991)), and with the models about self-control
costs associated to the presence in the menu of tempting alternatives (see Gul
and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004)). Naturally, the most ambiguous alternatives
are those involving higher risk of disappointment.2 Thus, individuals with
2 This intuition synchronizes with the measures of potential disappointment that Bell
(1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986) or Gul (1991) propose for lotteries in a choice under
uncertainty framework.
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problems of self-control may prefer to commit to a restricted opportunity set
excluding any ambiguous (and tempting) alternatives as a defence mechanism
against the potential disappointment they may yield.
Finally, related to the concept of disappointment is that of regret. An
individual experiences regret when, after choosing an alternative from the
menu, he feels that he could have chosen another better one (see Bell (1982),
and Loomes and Sugden (1982)). Now, in order to avoid regret, the decision
maker might actually prefer to renounce the option to choose ambiguous
alternatives, which, again, by their nature, are more likely to produce regret.
Any of the above reasons may, therefore, lead to a disutility due to the
mere presence of ambiguous options in the menu. Therefore, the monotonic-
ity assumption, which is referential in the freedom of choice literature, may
be violated. Now, the shrinking of an opportunity set may be desirable if the
gain in ease of choice is enough to compensate for the preference for freedom.
In other words, a trade-off arises between the preference for freedom of choice
and the preference for ease of choice, which suggests the convenience of an
axiomatic approach.
In order to perform an axiomatic exploration of the formal effects of those
two opposite forces in an intuitive way, we introduce a simple qualitative
distinction among the feasible alternatives. We split them into a binary
partition based on a certain standard of ambiguity, or the decision-maker’s
degree of knowledge about the alternatives. According to this distinction,
some alternatives are sufficiently unambiguous for the decision maker, while
the rest do not meet the given standard (for example, some dishes on the
menu have been tried previously, while in others the ingredients or mode of
preparation are unfamiliar; references are available for some candidates for
a job, but not for others, and so on). This rough distinction is enough to
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show that the informational aspect inevitably introduces a different way to
evaluate opportunity sets.
Taking the above mentioned distinction, in the following sections we pro-
vide characterizations of several rankings on the basis of very simple axioms.
In Section 2 we introduce some notation and definitions. In Section 3 we
axiomatically characterize a rule for ranking sets that takes into account
only the number of unambiguous options available to the decision maker. By
changing one of the axioms we obtain a family of rankings that is based on
two numbers only - the number of unambiguous options in the menu, and
the number of ambiguous ones, where the former are positively weighted and
the latter are negatively weighted. This family is introduced in Section 4,
and the axiomatic characterizations of three particular rules belonging to the
family are presented in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6 with some final
remarks.
2 Basic setup
Let X be a non-empty set of alternatives (finite or infinite) with |X| ≥ 2,
and let X be the set of all finite subsets of X. We will denote the elements
of X by A,B . . .. We distinguish two categories of alternatives in X - those
whose relevant aspects are sufficiently well determined, and the rest, that
is, those for which there is insufficient information concerning their relevant
characteristics. We will label the former as “unambiguous” options, and the
latter as “ambiguous” options.
The standards for this distinction may depend on several factors. For ex-
ample, it can be sensitive to subjective aspects - some individuals may have
very high informational standards in order to feel comfortable when making
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a choice, in which case they will be more prone to labeling options as am-
biguous. The standards may also depend on the significance or triviality of
the particular problem of choice, on the degree of time-pressure under which
the decision must be made, or other factors. Similarly, according to our ter-
minology, an option could still be labeled as “ambiguous” if the information
in possession of the decision maker is abundant but not sufficiently relevant -
for example, an employer may have very detailed information about certain
aspects of a candidate, such as his private life, but not a clue about his labor
skills. In any case, for the purposes of the model, what matters is simply to
recognize the fact that such a partition between ambiguous and unambiguous
alternatives can be made according to a certain standard. This crisp distinc-
tion is sufficient to cover our main concern, namely, that taking into account
informational aspects together with the assumption of ambiguity aversion
leads naturally to a very different kind of rules for ranking opportunity sets.
As mentioned in the Introduction, and following the line of Pattanaik and
Xu’s (1990) analysis of the value of freedom of choice, we do not presuppose
the existence of a preference relation over the set X of basic alternatives.
This is also coherent with Nozick’s (1974) defense of the intrinsic value of
freedom of choice, or Mill’s (1956) view that choice is desirable as a means to
develop human faculties. It is also supported by the existing theories about
the psychological and emotional benefits of the mere ability to choose. Thus,
our model is not about the indirect utility a choice situation provides to the
decision maker, but about its degrees of freedom and ease of choice, and the
trade-offs between these two aspects.
Consequently, in our context the problem can be determined by consid-
ering two aspects - the opportunity set the agent enjoys, which is assumed
to be an element of X , and the set of alternatives in X, the relevant charac-
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teristics of which the decision maker has enough information about, that is,
the set of unambiguous alternatives. We will call this set the unambiguous
set or information set and assume it to be finite, i.e., this set will also be an
element of X . In order to avoid some trivialities, we assume further that the
unambiguous set is not empty.
Thus, we are formally interested in the elements of X ×X∅, where X∅ :=
X \ {∅}. We call each (A,C) ∈ X × X∅ a choice situation and attach to it
the interpretation that the decision maker has the opportunity to choose an
option in A while having enough information about the options contained in
C. Comparisons of choice situations will be represented by a binary relation
% defined on X × X∅. For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) % (B,D)
should be read as “the opportunity to choose from A while knowing about
the options in C is weakly preferred to the opportunity to choose from B
while knowing about the options in D”. The asymmetric and symmetric
parts of % will be denoted by  and ∼, respectively. We want % to capture
both the preference for freedom of choice and the aversion to the presence of
ambiguous options. Finally, by P we denote the set of all complete preorders
(reflexive, transitive and complete binary relations) defined on X × X∅.
An important feature of the model is that the unambiguous set is variable
across different choice situations. This reflects the fact that individuals can
gather information about the alternatives, and provides a formal framework
to analyze the effects on individual welfare of the provision of information, as
well as further questions, such as the willingness to pay to obtain information.
3 The unambiguous-options-based rule
We start our analysis by introducing the following four axioms:
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Empty choice (EC): For all C,D ∈ X∅, (∅, C) ∼ (∅, D).
Monotonicity towards unambiguous options (M): For each C ∈ X∅ there
exists A ∈ X \X such that (A ∪ {x} , C)  (A,C) for some x ∈ C \ A.
Neutrality towards ambiguous options (N): For each C ∈ X∅ \X there exists
A ∈ X \X such that (A ∪ {x} , C) ∼ (A,C) for some x ∈ X \ (A ∪ C).
Independence (IND): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, and all x ∈ X \ A,
y ∈ X \ B with x ∈ C ⇔ y ∈ D, (A,C) % (B,D) ⇔ (A ∪ {x} , C) %
(B ∪ {y} , D).
According to EC, the decision maker is indifferent between any two situ-
ations in which he has no options to choose from, regardless of the amount
of information he might have about the (unavailable) alternatives.
Axiom M states that, given any information set, C, we can always find
some opportunity set, A, that can be improved by adding some new unam-
biguous option to it. This is a rather weak requirement if one assumes that
freedom of choice is valuable to the decision maker. Especially, the axiom
becomes very plausible if one thinks of A as the empty set and x as any
unambiguous option.
According to N, given any information set, there exists some opportunity
set, and some option that does not belong to it, such that the addition of
that option to the set does not affect the desirability of the choice situation.
It could be interpreted as being equivalent to assuming that the extra free-
dom incorporated through the addition of the new option is canceled by the
aversion felt towards its presence as a result of its ambiguity. For example,
this axiom is plausible if one believes that ambiguity only causes aversion
when the number of opportunities is great enough. Another possible way to
think about N is by assuming that marginal freedom is decreasing with the
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number of available options while marginal aversion is increasing with it, and
at a certain point the two equalize.
IND displays the effect of adding (or dropping) two options that are “of
the same type” in the sense that they are either both unambiguous or both
ambiguous. The axiom says that the original ranking between any two choice
situations is preserved under such a modification. This axiom adapts to our
context other similar axioms often found in the literature about freedom of
choice.
As we will see in the first theorem, the four axioms introduced so far
provide a characterization of the unambiguous-options-based rule %u∈ P,
which is defined as follows:
For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅,
(A,C) %u (B,D) iff |A ∩ C| ≥ |B ∩D| .
Theorem 1 Let %∈ P. Then % satisfies EC, IND, M, and N if and only if
%=%u.
The proof is presented in the appendix.
In order to show the independence of the axioms used for the character-
ization of %u, consider the following four examples. The reader can easily
check that each example satisfies all axioms except one:
¬(EC): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff (1) |C| < |D|,
or (2) |C| = |D| and |A ∩ C| ≥ |B ∩D|.
¬(IND): Let |X| ≥ 3. For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, let % be defined as
follows: (1) if |A| ≥ 3 and |B| ≥ 3, then (A,C) ∼ (B,D), (2) if |A| ≥ 3 and
|B| < 3, then (A,C)  (B,D), (3) if |A| < 3 and |B| < 3, then %=%u.
¬(M): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff |A ∩ C| ≤
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|B ∩D|.
¬(N): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff (1) |A ∩ C| >
|B ∩D|, or (2) |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D| and |A \ C| ≤ |B \D|.
4 A family of rules
Axiom N states that, at a certain point, the decision maker will remain
indifferent to the addition of a certain ambiguous option. The next axiom
shows that it is also always possible to find opportunity sets for which the
decision maker will be averse to the addition of a certain ambiguous option.
Aversion towards ambiguous options (AV): For each C ∈ X∅ \X there exists
A ∈ X \X such that (A ∪ {x} , C) ≺ (A,C) for some x ∈ X \ (A ∪ C).
In other words, AV expresses the idea that there is some situation where
the preference for an easier choice arises. In particular, AV says that, what-
ever the information set we consider, there exist some opportunity set, A,
and some ambiguous option that does not belong to A, such that the former
is worsened by the addition of the latter.
It turns out that the replacement of N with AV in the characterization
displayed by Theorem 1 does not result in a unique rule for ranking choice
situations; it rather generates a family of rules that are based on two numbers
only - the number of unambiguous options and the number of ambiguous op-
tions, where the former are positively weighted and the latter are negatively
weighted.
Theorem 2 Let %∈ P satisfy EC, IND, M, and AV. Then, for all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈
X × X∅,
(1) (|A ∩ C| > |B ∩D| and |A \ C| < |B \D|) implies (A,C)  (B,D),
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(2) (|A ∩ C| ≥ |B ∩D| and |A \ C| ≤ |B \D|) implies (A,C) % (B,D).
The proof is presented in the appendix.
5 Trade-offs
In this section we introduce three additional and alternative axioms that,
when added to conditions EC, IND, M, and AV, will finally lead to three
particular rankings of choice situations that belong to the family described in
Theorem 2. Each of these rankings provides a different solution to the trade-
off between the preference for unambiguous alternatives and the aversion to
ambiguous ones. The first two rules combine these aspects lexicographically,
while the third is of an additive nature.
5.1 The unambiguous-options-priority rule
Let us consider a situation where (A,C)  (B,D) for some (A,C) , (B,D) ∈
X × X∅, and where the opportunity set B is included in A ∩ C, i.e., B
contains only options that would be unambiguous in the choice situation
(A,C). The idea of robustness of the strict preference displayed by the next
axiom requires in this case that the addition of a new option to A does not
change the original ranking.
Robustness 1 (ROB1): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅ with B ⊂ (A ∩ C)
and for all x ∈ X, (A,C)  (B,D)⇒ (A ∪ {x} , C)  (B,D).
In other words, ROB1 imposes a restriction in a very particular class of
comparisons that can be motivated as follows. Assume that, starting from
a choice situation, (B,D), there is a transition to another choice situation,
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(A,C), where the number of available options has been enlarged, and, more-
over, there has been an improvement in the information in the sense that
the agent has obtained all the relevant information about the options in B
that were ambiguous at the beginning. The axiom says that, in such a case,
a preference for (A,C) (which is quite plausible) should be robust enough to
resist the incorporation of a new option in A, even if the newly added option
is an ambiguous one.
We have shown in Section 4 that EC, IND, M, and AV generate a family
of rules for ranking choice situations. Adding ROB1 to these axioms results
in the characterization of the unambiguous-options-priority rule %up∈ P ,
which is defined as follows:
For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅,
(A,C) %up (B,D) iff

|A ∩ C| > |B ∩D| ,
or
|A ∩ C| = |B ∩D| and |A \ C| ≤ |B \D| .
Theorem 3 Let %∈ P. Then % satisfies EC, IND, M, AV, and ROB1 if
and only if %=%up.
The proof is presented in the appendix.
The independence of the axioms used for the characterization of %up can
be checked by means of the following five examples:
¬(EC): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff (1) |C| < |D|,
or (2) |C| = |D| and (A,C) %up (B,D).
¬(IND): Let |X| ≥ 3. For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, let % be defined as
follows: (1) if |A| ≥ 3 and |B| ≥ 3, then (A,C) ∼ (B,D), (2) if |A| ≥ 3 and
|B| < 3, then (A,C)  (B,D), (3) if |A| < 3 and |B| < 3, then %=%up.
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¬(M): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff (1) |A ∩ C| <
|B ∩D|, or (2) |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D| and |A \ C| ≤ |B \D|.
¬(AV): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff |A| ≥ |B|.
¬(ROB1): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X ×X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff (1) |A \ C| <
|B \D|, or (2) |A \ C| = |B \D| and |A ∩ C| ≥ |B ∩D|.
5.2 The ambiguous-options-priority rule
Let us now consider another notion of robustness, as shown by the following
axiom:
Robustness 2 (ROB2): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅ with A ⊂ (B \D)
and for all x ∈ X, (A,C)  (B,D)⇒ (A,C)  (B ∪ {x} , D).
In the case of condition ROB2, whenever the opportunity set A consists
only of options that would be ambiguous in the situation (B,D), and if
(A,C) is strictly better than (B,D), then the ranking should be preserved
when a new option is added to B. In other words, assume now that, in the
transition from (B,D) to (A,C) the agent has lost opportunities and that
only ambiguous options (in the new situation) remain.3 Then, a preference
for (A,C) over (B,D) should be robust enough as to resist the incorporation
to B of a new option, even if it is unambiguous. In other words, the idea
behind ROB2 is that, if there is some reason for such a preference for (A,C)
to arise, even when A is a subset of the ambiguous options in situation
(B,D), this reason should have enough weight as to resist any additional
3 One might not expect the information to shrink in the transition from one situation to
another. However, the informational requirements in the new situation might have changed
such that information about the alternatives, that was initially considered sufficient, later
becomes insufficient.
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slight changes. In some sense, ROB2 is a dual version of ROB1, however,
they are not logically compatible.
As shown in our next theorem, the addition of ROB2 to EC, IND, M,
and AV results in the characterization of the ambiguous-options-priority rule
%ap∈ P , which is defined as follows:
For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅,
(A,C) %ap (B,D) iff

|A \ C| < |B \D| ,
or
|A \ C| = |B \D| and |A ∩ C| ≥ |B ∩D| .
Theorem 4 Let %∈ P. Then % satisfies EC, IND, M, AV, and ROB2 if
and only if %=%ap.
The proof is presented in the appendix.
In order to show the independence of the axioms used for the characteri-
zation of %ap, consider the following examples:
¬(EC): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff (1) |C| < |D|,
or (2) |C| = |D| and (A,C) %ap (B,D).
¬(IND): Let |X| ≥ 3. For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, let % be defined as
follows: (1) if |A| ≥ 3 and |B| ≥ 3, then (A,C) ∼ (B,D), (2) if |A| < 3 and
|B| ≥ 3, then (A,C)  (B,D), (3) if |A| < 3 and |B| < 3, then %=%ap.
¬(M): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X×X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff |A \ C| ≤ |B \D|.
¬(AV): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff (1) |A \ C| >
|B \D|, or (2) |A \ C| = |B \D| and |A ∩ C| ≥ |B ∩D|.
¬(ROB2): Take %=%up.
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5.3 The difference rule
Let us now consider the following axiom.
Dichotomy (DI): For each C ∈ X∅ \ X there exists A ∈ X∅ \ X such that
(A \ {x} , C) ∼ (A ∪ {y} , C) for some x ∈ A∩C, and some y ∈ X \ (A ∪ C).
Condition DI is the result of adapting an axiom used by Dimitrov et al.
(2004) to our decisional context. The axiom states that, for any information
set, there exists some opportunity set for which there is a perfect substitution
between unambiguous and ambiguous options - a loss of freedom due to the
removal of some unambiguous option from the set is, somehow, equivalent
to a loss of ease of choice due to some ambiguous option being added to
it. Though it is an independent axiom, the idea suggested by DI is close to
that suggested by N. For example, one possible interpretation (but not the
only one) is that the loss of freedom resulting from dropping an unambiguous
option is decreasing with the number of available alternatives, while the loss
of ease of choice caused by adding an ambiguous option is increasing with
the number of alternatives. Then the axiom would say that at certain point
both values equalize.
We are now ready to present the characterization of the difference rule,
%d∈ P , defined as follows:
For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅,
(A,C) %d (B,D) iff |A ∩ C| − |A \ C| ≥ |B ∩D| − |B \D| .
Theorem 5 Let %∈ P. Then % satisfies EC, IND, M, and DI if and only
if %=%d.
The proof is presented in the appendix.
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In order to check the independence of the axioms used for the character-
ization of %d, the reader can consider the following examples:
¬(EC): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) % (B,D) iff (1) |C| < |D|,
or (2) |C| = |D| and (A,C) %d (B,D).
¬(IND): Let X = {x, y}, and consider the following ranking on X × X∅:
({x, y}, {x, y})  ({x}, {x}) ∼ ({y}, {y}) ∼ ({x}, {x, y}) ∼ ({y}, {x, y})
(∅, {x}) ∼ (∅, {y})∼ (∅, {x, y})∼ ({x, y}, {x})∼ ({x, y}, {y})  ({y}, {x})
 ({x}, {y}).
¬(M): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅, (A,C) ∼ (B,D).
¬(DI): For all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈ X × X∅ : (A,C) % (B,D) iff |A| ≥ |B|.
6 Concluding remarks
Our model assumes the preference for freedom of choice, but also the pos-
sibility of an aversion to alternatives whose characteristics are sufficiently
unknown (what we have called a preference for easy choices). Among the
different ways in which the decision maker may evaluate opportunity sets
containing both “ambiguous” and “unambiguous” options, we propose some
plausible solutions derived from a common axiomatic basis. These core ax-
ioms are Empty Choice (EC), Independence (IND), andMonotonicity towards
unambiguous options (M). Adding Neutrality towards ambiguous options (N)
to this basis leads to the unambiguous-options-based rule, which establishes
that it is the number of unambiguous options that determines the rank-
ing. However, when replacing N by Aversion towards ambiguous options
(AV), there arises a family of rules that takes into account ease of choice
by negatively weighting the number of ambiguous options. Then, starting
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from EC, IND, M, and AV, by imposing either of the Robustness axioms
(ROB1 or ROB2), we obtain, respectively, the characterization of two lexi-
cographic rules - the unambiguous-options-priority-rule and the ambiguous-
options-priority rule. We have already noted the differences between ROB1
and ROB2. Thus, it is up to the reader to choose between the two ideas
of robustness. Finally, if instead of either of the robustness axioms we use
Dichotomy (DI), then an additive rule that maximizes the difference between
the number of unambiguous and ambiguous options is obtained.
Our model performs an axiomatic analysis of the possible effects of the
presence of ambiguity, starting with a very elementary partition into ambigu-
ous and unambiguous options, which is enough to obtain plausible ways of
comparing opportunity sets that depart qualitatively from the related mod-
els or ranking sets in terms of freedom of choice. A natural step forward in
this research is to advance in defining the structure of the agent’s informa-
tion about the alternatives. This would presumably also lead to more refined
results.
The examples we have used to explain our model are very much based on
everyday life choices. However, the trade-off between preference for freedom
of choice and aversion to ambiguity could also serve as a basis to explain more
complex sociological and anthropological phenomena, such as the reasons
why societies or groups adhere to opportunity-restricting institutions (certain
religious practices, for example), or even clearly unfair institutions, such as
apartheid or slavery, as suggested by the paper’s leading quotation. In terms
of the general ideas of the paper, we could interpret that such institutions
prevail as far as practitioners are sufficiently sure of the consequences of the
opportunities they offer, and sufficiently uncertain about the consequences
of removing the restrictions. Thus, it is not until an alternative institution
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is sufficiently well-established, and the consequences of the opportunities it
offers are therefore less ambiguous, that it can substitute the old one or
coexist alongside it. (See, for example, Chapter 11 in Bowles (2004) for a
dynamic model of institutional change of this nature).
As a final thought, it is clear that the idea of “the more freedom of choice
the better” prevails in many cultures, especially western ones, in some cases
to the extent of becoming a political watchword. However, when it comes to
social welfare policy making, one of the potential lessons to be drawn from
the general ideas presented in this work is that the idea of freedom should be
qualified, in the sense that it might only be effective when people are well-
informed about their choices. This appeals clearly to educational policies.
So that, at some point, it might be better to use public resources on enabling
consumers, voters, entrepreneurs, or workers to make well-informed choices,
rather than on enlarging their set of options just for the sake of it.
7 Appendix
This section collects the proofs of all theorems that appear in the text. In
what follows, for all S ⊆ X and all k ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}, we denote by (S)k any
subset of S with k elements.
Theorem 1 Let %∈ P. Then % satisfies EC, IND, M, and N if and only if
%=%u.
We will first prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 Let %∈ P satisfy IND and M. Then (B ∪ E,D)  (B,D) for all
(B,D) ∈ X × X∅ and all E ⊆ (D \B) \ {∅}.
Proof of Lemma 1. Take %∈ P as above and let E = {e1, . . . , en}. By
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M, there exists A ∈ X \ X such that (A ∪ {x}, D)  (A,D) for some
x ∈ D \ A. Applying IND repeatedly and conveniently this implies that
({x}, D)  (∅, D) for some x ∈ D \ A. By reflexivity, (∅, D) ∼ (∅, D) and
by IND, ({x}, D) ∼ ({e1}, D). Thus, by transitivity, ({e1}, D)  (∅, D).
Now, by IND applied conveniently (B ∪ {e1}, D)  (B,D). Repeating
the same argument with e2 we obtain (B ∪ {e1, e2}, D)  (B ∪ {e1}, D),
and by the same argument repeated (n − 2)-times and transitivity, we get
(B ∪ E,D)  (B,D).
Lemma 2 Let %∈ P satisfy IND and N. Then (B ∪ E,D) ∼ (B,D) for all
(B,D) ∈ X × X∅ and all E ⊆ X \ (B ∪D) .
Proof of Lemma 2. If E = ∅, then Lemma 2 is satisfied by reflexivity.
Otherwise, the proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 applying N in-
stead of M.
Proof of Theorem 1. Clearly, %u satisfies the axioms. Suppose now
that %∈ P satisfies EC, IND, M, and N. We have to prove that, for all
(A,C), (B,D) ∈ X × X∅,
(1) |A ∩ C| > |B ∩D| implies (A,C)  (B,D), and
(2) |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D| implies (A,C) ∼ (B,D).
(1) Let |A ∩ C| > |B ∩D|. By EC, (∅, C) ∼ (∅, D). If |B ∩D| = 0 (i.e.,
B ∩ D = ∅), (A ∩ C,C)  (∅, C) follows from Lemma 1 with A ∩ C in the
role of E. By transitivity, (A ∩ C,C)  (B ∩D,D). If |B ∩D| = s > 0,
applying IND s-times results in ((A ∩ C)s , C) ∼ (B ∩D,D). By Lemma 1,
with (A ∩ C)\(A ∩ C)s in the role of E, we have (A ∩ C,C)  ((A ∩ C)s , C).
This, by transitivity, results in (A ∩ C,C)  (B ∩D,D). If A \ C = ∅,
then, by reflexivity, (A,C) ∼ (A ∩ C,C). If A \ C 6= ∅, then, by Lemma 2,
with A \ (A ∩ C) in the role of E, we also obtain (A,C) ∼ (A ∩ C,C). By
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an analogous argument, we have (B,D) ∼ (B ∩D,D), and by transitivity,
(A,C)  (B,D).
(2) Let |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D|. As before, by applying EC and IND the nec-
essary number of times, we get (A ∩ C,C) ∼ (B ∩D,D). By Lemma 2, with
A \C in the role of E, we have (A,C) ∼ (A ∩ C,C). By the same argument,
and with B \ D in the role of E, we have (B,D) ∼ (B ∩D,D). Thus, by
transitivity, (A,C) ∼ (B,D).
Theorem 2 Let %∈ P satisfy EC, IND, M, and AV. Then, for all (A,C) , (B,D) ∈
X × X∅,
(1) (|A ∩ C| > |B ∩D| and |A \ C| < |B \D|) implies (A,C)  (B,D),
(2) (|A ∩ C| ≥ |B ∩D| and |A \ C| ≤ |B \D|) implies (A,C) % (B,D).
Note first that the following lemma holds true.
Lemma 3 Let %∈ P satisfy IND and AV. Then (B ∪ E,D) ≺ (B,D) for
all (B,D) ∈ X × X∅ and all E ⊆ (X \ (B ∪D)) \ {∅}.
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 except
that AV is applied instead of M.
Proof of Theorem 2. (1) Let |A ∩ C| |B ∩D| and |A \ C| < |B \D|. As in
the first part of the proof of Theorem 1, it can be proved, by using EC, IND
and M, that (A ∩ C,C)  (B ∩D,D). By Lemma 3, we have (B ∩D,D) 
(B,D). Let |A \ C| = u. Starting from (A ∩ C,C)  (B ∩D,D) and apply-
ing u-times IND, we obtain (A,C)  ((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)u , D). By Lemma 3,
with (B \D)\ (B \D)u in the role of E, ((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)u , D)  (B,D).
By transitivity, (A,C)  (B,D).
(2) The case in which |A ∩ C| > |B ∩D| and |A \ C| < |B \D| was
proved in the previous paragraph. Thus, we will distinguish the three re-
maining possible cases:
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(2.1) |A ∩ C| > |B ∩D| and |A \ C| = |B \D|,
(2.2) |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D| and |A \ C| < |B \D|, and
(2.3) |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D| and |A \ C| = |B \D|.
(2.1) As in the first part of the proof of Theorem 1, it can be proved, by
using EC, IND and M, that (A ∩ C,C)  (B ∩D,D). If |A \ C| = |B \D| =
0, then it follows directly that (A,C)  (B,D). If |A \ C| = |B \D| = u > 0,
by IND repeated u-times, (A,C)  (B,D).
(2.2) Let |A \ C| = u. From EC and applying u-times IND, (A \ C,C) ∼
((B \D)u , D). By Lemma 3, with (B \D) \ (B \D)u in the role of E,
((B \D)u , D)  (B \D,D). By transitivity, (A \ C,C)  (B \D,D). Ap-
plying IND |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D|-times, (A,C)  (B,D).
(2.3) From EC and applying IND |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D|-times, (A ∩ C,C) ∼
(B ∩D,D). Again by IND applied |A \ C| = |B \D|-times, (A,C) ∼ (B,D).
Theorem 3 Let %∈ P. Then % satisfies EC, IND, M, AV, and ROB1 if
and only if %=%up.
Proof of Theorem 3. It can be easily checked that %up satisfies the five
axioms. Suppose now that %∈ P satisfies EC, IND, M, AV, and ROB1. We
have to prove that, for all (A,C), (B,D) ∈ X × X∅,
(1) |A ∩ C| > |B ∩D| implies (A,C)  (B,D),
(2) (|A ∩ C| = |B ∩D| and |A \ C| < |B \D|) implies (A,C)  (B,D),
and
(3) (|A ∩ C| = |B ∩D| and |A \ C| = |B \D|) implies (A,C) ∼ (B,D).
(1) Let |A ∩ C| > |B ∩D|. As in the first part of the proof of Theorem
1, EC, IND, and M together imply (A ∩ C,C)  (B ∩D,D).
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Let us now consider the following partitions of A ∩ C and B ∩D :
A ∩ C = (A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2 ∪ (A ∩ C)3 ,
B ∩D = (B ∩D)1 ∪ (B ∩D)2 ,
where
(A ∩ C)1 = {x ∈ A ∩ C | x ∈ B ∩D} ,
(A ∩ C)2 = {x ∈ A ∩ C | x ∈ D \ (B ∩D)} ,
(A ∩ C)3 = {x ∈ A ∩ C | x ∈ X \D} ,
(B ∩D)1 = {x ∈ B ∩D | x ∈ A ∩ C} ,
(B ∩D)2 = {x ∈ B ∩D | x ∈ X \ (A ∩ C)} .
By construction (A ∩ C)1 = (B ∩D)1. Hence, B ∩ D = (A ∩ C)1 ∪
(B ∩D)2. Let ∣∣(B ∩D)2∣∣ = s2. We will consider two cases:
(1.1)
∣∣(A ∩ C)2∣∣ > s2, and
(1.2)
∣∣(A ∩ C)2∣∣ ≤ s2.
(1.1) By Theorem 2,(
(A ∩ C)1 ∪ (B ∩D)2 , D) ∼ ((A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2s2 , D) .
Hence, (B ∩D,D) ∼ ((A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2s2 , D), and by transitivity,
(A ∩ C,C)  ((A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2s2 , D) .
By ROB1 repeatedly applied, (A,C)  ((A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2s2 , D). By
transitivity, (A,C)  (B ∩D,D). If B \ D = ∅, we have that (A,C) 
(B,D). If B \ D 6= ∅, then, by Lemma 3, (B ∩D,D)  (B,D), and by
transitivity, (A,C)  (B,D).
(1.2) By Theorem 2,(
(A ∩ C)1 ∪ (B ∩D)2 , D) ∼ ((A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2 ∪ (B ∩D)2∗ , D) ,
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where (B ∩D)2∗ is any subset of (B ∩D)2 s.t.
∣∣(B ∩D)2∗∣∣ = ∣∣(B ∩D)2∣∣ −∣∣(A ∩ C)2∣∣. Again by Theorem 2,(
(A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2 ∪ (B ∩D)2∗ , D
)
∼ ((A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2 ∪ (A ∩ C)3∗ , (D ∪ (A ∩ C)3∗) \ (B ∩D)2∗) ,
where (A ∩ C)3∗ is any subset of (A ∩ C)3 s.t.
∣∣(A ∩ C)3∗∣∣ = ∣∣(B ∩D)2∣∣ −∣∣(A ∩ C)2∣∣ (given that |A ∩ C| > |B ∩D| by hypothesis, and |A ∩ C|2 ≤
|B ∩D|2 such a subset always exists). By transitivity,(
(A ∩ C)1 ∪ (B ∩D)2 , D)
∼ ((A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2 ∪ (A ∩ C)3∗ , (D ∪ (A ∩ C)3∗) \ (B ∩D)2∗) ,
that is
(B ∩D,D)
∼ ((A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2 ∪ (A ∩ C)3∗ , (D ∪ (A ∩ C)3∗) \ (B ∩D)2∗) .
By transitivity,
(A ∩ C,C)
 ((A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2 ∪ (A ∩ C)3∗ , (D ∪ (A ∩ C)3∗) \ (B ∩D)2∗) .
By ROB1 repeatedly applied,
(A,C)
 ((A ∩ C)1 ∪ (A ∩ C)2 ∪ (A ∩ C)3∗ , (D ∪ (A ∩ C)3∗) \ (B ∩D)2∗) .
By transitivity, (A,C)  (B ∩D,D). If B \D 6= ∅, then, by Lemma 3,
(B ∩D,D)  (B,D). If B \D = ∅, then B ∩D = B. Again by transitivity,
(A,C)  (B,D).
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(2) Let |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D| and |A \ C| < |B \D|. By Theorem 2,
(A ∩ C,C) ∼ (B ∩D,D). Let |A \ C| = u. By IND repeated u-times,
(A,C) ∼ ((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)u , D) .
By Lemma 3, with B \ ((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)u) in the role of E,
((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)u , D)  (B,D). Thus, by transitivity, (A,C)  (B,D).
(3) Let |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D| and |A \ C| = |B \D|. By Theorem 2,
(A,C) ∼ (B,D).
Theorem 4 Let %∈ P. Then % satisfies EC, IND, M, AV, and ROB2 if
and only if %=%ap.
Proof of Theorem 4. It is not difficult to check that %ap satisfies the five
axioms. Suppose now that %∈ P satisfies EC, IND, M, AV, and ROB2. We
have to prove that, for all (A,C), (B,D) ∈ X × X∅,
(1) |A \ C| < |B \D| implies (A,C)  (B,D),
(2) (|A \ C| = |B \D| and |A ∩ C| > |B ∩D|) implies (A,C)  (B,D),
and
(3) (|A \ C| = |B \D| and |A ∩ C| = |B ∩D|) implies (A,C) ∼ (B,D).
(1) Let |A \ C| = u and |B \D| = v, with v > u. By EC and IND applied
u-times, (A \ C,C) ∼ ((B \D)u , D). By Lemma 3, with (B \D) \ (B \D)u
in the role of E, ((B \D)u , D)  (B \D,D). By transitivity, (A \ C,C) 
(B \D,D).
Now, let us consider the following partitions of A \ C and B \D :
A \ C = (A \ C)1 ∪ (A \ C)2 ,
B \D = (B \D)1 ∪ (B \D)2 ∪ (B \D)3 ,
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where
(A \ C)1 = {x ∈ A \ C | x ∈ B \D} ,
(A \ C)2 = {x ∈ A \ C | x ∈ X \ (B \D)} ,
(B \D)1 = {x ∈ B \D | x ∈ A \ C} = (A \ C)1 ,
(B \D)2 = {x ∈ B \D | x ∈ X \ (A ∪ C)} ,
(B \D)3 = {x ∈ B \D | x ∈ C} .
Let (A \ C)1 = {a−1 , . . . , a−u1}, (A \ C)2 = {a−u1+1, . . . , a−u }, (B \D)1 ={




, (B \D)2 = {b−u1+1, . . . , b−v2}, (B \D)3 = {b−v2+1, . . . , b−v }. Note
that, by hypothesis,
∣∣(B \D)2∣∣ + ∣∣(B \D)3∣∣ > ∣∣(A \ C)2∣∣. We will consider
two cases:
(1.1)
∣∣(A \ C)2∣∣ > ∣∣(B \D)2∣∣, and
(1.2)
∣∣(A \ C)2∣∣ ≤ ∣∣(B \D)2∣∣.
(1.1) Let
∣∣(A \ C)2∣∣ > ∣∣(B \D)2∣∣. Consider {b−v2+1, . . . , b−u } ⊂ (B \D)3
and let (A \ C)2v2 =
{




, (A \ C)2v =
{







(A \ C) ∪ (B \D)2) \ (A \ C)2v2 , C) ∼ (A \ C,C). Let
B∗ =
(
(A \ C) ∪ (B \D)2 ∪ {b−v2+1, . . . , b−u }) \ ((A \ C)2v2 ∪ (A \ C)2v) .




C ∪ (A \ C)2v





C ∪ (A \ C)2v
) \ {b−v2+1, . . . , b−u })  (B \D,D). Note
that, by construction, B∗ ⊂ B \ D. Thus, by ROB2 repeatedly applied,(
B∗,
(
C ∪ (A \ C)2v
) \ {b−v2+1, . . . , b−u })  ((B \D) ∪ (B ∩D) , D). Given that
the first choice situation is indifferent to (A \ C,C), by transitivity, (A \ C,C) 
(B,D). By Lemma 1, (A,C)  (A \ C,C), and again by transitivity, (A,C) 
(B,D).
(1.2) Let
∣∣(A \ C)2∣∣ ≤ ∣∣(B \D)2∣∣. Consider {b−u1+1, . . . , b−u } ⊆ (B \D)2.
Then
((




(A \ C)1 ∪ {b−u1+1, . . . , b−u }) \ (A \ C)2 , C)  (B \D,D).
By ROB2,
((
(A \ C)1 ∪ {b−u1+1, . . . , b−u }) \ (A \ C)2 , C)  (B,D). By Lemma
1, (A,C)  (A \ C,C), and by transitivity, (A,C)  (B,D).
(2) LetA\C = {a−1 , . . . , a−u }, B\D = {b−1 , . . . , b−u }, A∩C = {a+1 , . . . , a+r },
andB∩D = {b+1 , . . . , b+s }, r > s. By Theorem 2, ((A \ C) ∪ {a+1 , . . . , a+s } , C) ∼
(B,D). By Lemma 1, (A,C)  ((A \ C) ∪ {a+1 , . . . , a+s } , C). Again by tran-
sitivity, (A,C)  (B,D).
(3) By Theorem 2, (A,C) ∼ (B,D).
Theorem 5 Let %∈ P. Then % satisfies EC, IND, M, and DI if and only
if %=%d.
We will first prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4 Let %∈ P satisfy IND and DI, and let (A,C) , (B,C) ∈ X × X∅
be such that B = A ∪ E with |E ∩ C| = |E \ C|. Then (A,C) ∼ (B,C).
Proof of Lemma 4. Take %∈ P as above and let E ∩ C = {e+1 , . . . , e+n},
E \ C = {e−1 , . . . , e−n}.
If C = X, then E = ∅ and the Lemma is vacuously satisfied. If C ⊂ X,
we will only consider the case |E ∩ C| = |E \ C| > 0, otherwise the Lemma
is satisfied by reflexivity. Thus, given that C ⊂ X, by DI, there exists F ∈
X∅ \{X} such that (F \{x}, C) ∼ (F ∪{y} , C) for some x ∈ F ∩C and some
y ∈ X \ (F ∪ C). Applying IND repeatedly, we have (∅, C) ∼ ({x, y} , C) for
some x ∈ F ∩ C and some y ∈ X \ (F ∪ C). By reflexivity, (∅, C) ∼ (∅, C)
and by IND applied twice, ({x, y}, C) ∼ ({e+1 , e−1 }, C). Thus, by transitivity,
(∅, C) ∼ ({e+1 , e−1 }, C). By IND, ({e+2 , e−2 }, C) ∼ ({e+1 , e+2 , e−1 , e−2 }, C) and
by transitivity, (∅, C) ∼ ({e+1 , e+2 , e−1 , e−2 }, C). Repeating the same argument
(n − 2)-times and by transitivity, we have (∅, C) ∼ (E,C). Thus, by IND,
(A,C) ∼ (A ∪ E,C), i.e., (A,C) ∼ (B,C).
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Lemma 5 Let %∈ P satisfy IND, M, and DI. Then it also satisfies AV.
Proof of Lemma 5. Take %∈ P as above and notice that Lemma 1 and
Lemma 4 hold. In particular, by Lemma 1 we have that ({x, y} , C) 
({x} , C) for all x ∈ X and all y ∈ C ∈ X∅ with y 6= x. Furthermore, by
Lemma 4, we have (∅, C) ∼ ({x, y} , C) for all C ∈ X∅, all x ∈ C, and all
y ∈ X \ C.
In order to prove that % satisfies AV, we first prove the following
Claim ({x}, C)  ({x,w}, C) for all x ∈ X, all C ∈ X∅\X and all w ∈ X\C
with w 6= x.
Proof of the Claim. Consider first the case in which |X| = 2 and
let X = {x,w}. Notice that, in such a case, we have only to show that
({x}, {x})  ({x,w}, {x}) and ({w}, {w})  ({x,w}, {w}). We will demon-
strate, without loss of generality, the former implication. By Lemma 1,
({x}, {x})  (∅, {x}) and by Lemma 4, (∅, {x}) ∼ ({x,w}, {x}). Thus, by
transitivity, ({x}, {x})  ({x,w}, {x}).
Suppose next that |X| ≥ 3, and take x,w as in the Claim. If C 6= {x},
then there exists z ∈ C, z 6= x. By Lemma 4, (∅, C) ∼ ({z, w} , C), and
by Lemma 1 we have ({z, w} , C)  ({w} , C). By transitivity, (∅, C) 
({w} , C), and by IND, ({x} , C)  ({x,w} , C). If C = {x}, then, by Lemma
1, ({x,w}, C)  ({w}, C). By IND, ({x}, C)  (∅, C). On the other hand, by
Lemma 4, (∅, C) ∼ ({x,w}, C). Thus, by transitivity, ({x}, C)  ({x,w}, C),
and the claim is proved.
The Claim demonstrates that, for each C ∈ X∅\X, there exists A ∈ X \X
such that (A ∪ {w}, C) ≺ (A,C) for some w ∈ X \ (A ∪ C), as required by
AV. In particular, A could be any singleton included in C.
Corollary 1 Let %∈ P satisfy IND, M, and DI. Then the statement in
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Lemma 3 holds, that is, (B ∪ E,D) ≺ (B,D) for all (B,D) ∈ X × X∅ and
all E ⊆ (X \ (B ∪D)) \ {∅} .
Proof of Theorem 5. It can be easily checked that %d satisfies the four
axioms. Suppose now that %∈ P satisfies EC, IND, M, and DI. We have to
prove that, for all (A,C), (B,D) ∈ X × X∅,
(1) |A ∩ C| − |A \ C| > |B ∩D| − |B \D| implies (A,C)  (B,D), and
(2) |A ∩ C| − |A \ C| = |B ∩D| − |B \D| implies (A,C) ∼ (B,D).
Let |A ∩ C| = r, |B ∩D| = s, |A \ C| = u, |B \D| = v.
(1) In this case r − u > s − v. We consider the following three possible
cases:
(1.1) r > u and s > v,
(1.2) r > u and s ≤ v,
(1.3) r ≤ u and s < v.
(1.1) Let r > u and s > v. By EC, (∅, C) ∼ (∅, D). By Lemma 4,
((A ∩ C)u ∪ (A \ C) , C) ∼ (∅, C). Also by Lemma 4, ((B ∩D)v ∪ (B \D) , D) ∼
(∅, D). Thus, by transitivity, ((A ∩ C)u ∪ (A \ C) , C) ∼ ((B ∩D)v ∪ (B \D) , D).
Given that r−u > s−v, by IND applied (s−v)-times ((A ∩ C)u+s−v ∪ (A \ C) , C) ∼(




(A ∩ C)u+s−v ∪ (A \ C) , C
) ∼ (B,D).
By Lemma 1, (A,C)  ((A ∩ C)u+s−v ∪ (A \ C) , C), and by transitivity,
(A,C)  (B,D).
(1.2) Let r > u and s ≤ v. As in case (1.1), by EC, Lemma 4 and
transitivity we get ((A ∩ C)u ∪ (A \ C) , C) ∼ ((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)s , D). By
Lemma 1, (A,C)  ((A ∩ C)u ∪ (A \ C) , C), and, if s < v, by Lemma 3,
((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)s , D)  (B,D) .
If s = v, ((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)s , D) = (B,D). In any case, by transitivity,
(A,C)  (B,D).
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(1.3) Let r ≤ u and s < v. As before, by EC, Lemma 4 and tran-
sitivity we get ((A ∩ C) ∪ (A \ C)r , C) ∼ ((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)s , D). Since
r− u > s− v, then u− r < v− s. Then we can apply IND (u− r)-times ob-
taining
(
(A ∩ C) ∪ (A \ C)r+u−r , C
) ∼ ((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)s+u−r , D). That
is, (A,C) ∼ ((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)s+u−r , D). By Lemma 3,(
(B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)s+u−r , D
)  (B,D) .
Then, by transitivity, (A,C)  (B,D).
(2) In this case r − u = s − v. If r ≥ u (s ≥ v), then, as in case (1), by
EC, Lemma 4 and transitivity we get
((A ∩ C)u ∪ (A \ C) , C) ∼ ((B ∩D)v ∪ (B \D) , D) ,
and by IND applied (r − u)(= s− v)-times, (A,C) ∼ (B,D).
If r < u (s < v), then, by EC, Lemma 4 and transitivity we get
((A ∩ C) ∪ (A \ C)r , C) ∼ ((B ∩D) ∪ (B \D)s , D) ,
and by IND applied (u− r)(= v ≥ s)-times, (A,C) ∼ (B,D).
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